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Economic Environments and Third World Arms 
Production 
ROBERT E. LOONEY and P. C. FREDERIKSEN 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA 
In a previous paper [International Organiza-
tion, 40, 3 (1986)], we discussed the economic 
environment necessary to profile Latin Amer-
ican countries into arms producers and nonpro-
ducers. This environment was compared 
directly with earlier research which had sug-
gested an alternative environment: scale eco-
nomies, a large military and/or population, and 
a large national income. However, these "size" 
variables were unable to explain why some 
smaller countries (e.g. Ecuador, Peru and the 
Dominican Republic) were producers. Since 
we were able to correctly predict each coun-
try's classification as a producer or not, we 
concluded that our analysis supplemented this 
earlier work. This note reports our preliminary 
findings in which we attempt to extend the 
analysis to a larger sample of countries (49), 
including Latin America, 19 of which produced 
at least one major weapon in 1979-1980. An 
initial examination of each country showed 
large differences in the mean values of econo-
mic variables which depict balance of pay-
ments, debt and fiscal positions, defense 
spending, and other measures of economic 
performance such as gross national product 
(GNP). The producers tended to be larger, 
more open to foreign trade, with more external 
debt, more savings, and a more dynamic 
import and export performance. This cursory 
examination led us to conclude that no single 
factor can consistently predict whether a coun-
try is a producer or not. 
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A multiple-discriminant analysis was used to 
identify which factors or combination of factors 
correctly classifies countries as eitber produc-
ers or nonproducers. For all 49 countries, if 
total military expenditures were the only discri-
minating variable, 10 of the producers and two 
of the nonproducers were incorrectly classi-
fied. By adding public external borrowing and 
debt, and public external borrowing as a 
percent of exports, all nonproducers were 
correctly identified, but Ecuador, the Domini-
can Republic and Argentina were incorrectly 
predicted to be nonproducers. This result was 
unchanged after adding three additional vari-
ables to describe international reserves, growth 
in the government sector, and the current-
account balance. Adding variables which other 
researchers had found useful (GNP, popula-
tion and armed forces) did not improve the 
prediction with respect to these three coun-
tries. 
Since the three countries were all from Latin 
America, a separate analysis was conducted 
excluding Latin America. For these countries, 
we found that arms production depended 
almost exclusively on the volume of public and 
publicly generated external capital. Overall 
export and import performance seemed to play 
a small role in the establishment of main-
tenance of an indigenous arms industry. The 
ability to finance existing current-account 
deficits through publicly guaranteed loans is 
critical. If these countries do not possess large 
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and recent (1982) inflows of external capital, 
they are incapable of justifying or sustaining 
the ongoing production of a major weapon-
irrespective of their size or industrial sophisti-
cation. Military expenditures per se play no 
role whatsoever in the determination of 
whether these countries produce or not. 
For Latin America, we found that these 
countries can be correctly classified using only 
three variables-1960-1970 import and export 
growth, and 1970 accumulated public external 
debt. It appears that Latin American arms 
production has come about as a result of 
import substitution policies and high levels of 
protectionism in the 1960s. The industries 
survived in the 1970s due to rapid increases in 
foreign exchange which stemmed from a rapid 
rate of export growth and increased public 
external indebtedness. The only new producers 
between 1970 and 1980 were Mexico, Ecuador 
and Venezuela- all of which were oil expor-
ters with a relatively easy access to foreign 
exchange. 
For both groups of countries, economic size, 
per capita income, military capabilities or 
associated economies of scale in production do 
not appear to be either a necessary or sufficient 
condition for indigenous production. Instead, 
access to foreign exchange-presumably re-
quired to import parts and technology-is the 
main factor in determining whether arms pro-
duction will be established and maintained. 
The availability of foreign exchange however is 
a multidimensional factor which is not associ-
ated with one specific index such as export 
growth. 
If our analysis is correct, the prospects for 
the emergence of any new producer in Latin 
America is poor, given the lackluster export 
performance of the nonproducers and the 
current high levels of external debt. The 
situation may be less clear for the rest of the 
world. If the major arms suppliers want to 
restrict any new indigenous production, denials 
of credits at past levels would seem to be the 
most efficient way to proceed. · 
